Lessons from the Coronavirus crisis for European integration by Bongardt, Annette & Torres, Francisco
Intereconomics 2020 | 3
130
Editorial
Lessons From the Coronavirus 
Crisis for European Integration
The COVID-19 pandemic caused an exogenous shock that tests the resilience of European in-
tegration. The European Union fi nds itself at a crossroads. National uncoordinated responses 
threaten core European institutions, yet the crisis is also an opportunity to advance integra-
tion and reinforce EU objectives. This calls for addressing public health governance failures, 
dealing with the economic and institutional fallout, protecting common institutions, building 
up new ones and using the Green Deal as a crisis exit strategy. The challenge comes at a time 
when the UK had all but monopolised the EU’s attention and scarce resources with Brexit. 
This came at a high cost, as the Union was distracted from addressing common problems and 
neglected governance building.
How did we arrive at the current situation? The world did not heed warnings (e.g. of the Global 
Preparedness Monitoring Board report of September 2019) to think long term, prepare for a 
respiratory disease and cooperate on a global level for a coronavirus-type pandemic despite 
the many admonitions in this millennium alone (SARS, avian fl u, swine fl u, Ebola and Zika). 
In Europe, the pandemic crisis laid bare governance failures (lack of preparedness, slow re-
sponses). The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, created post-SARS in 
2005 to assess and monitor diseases and coordinate national responses, underestimated the 
risk to the European population and all but disappeared from the public sphere. Although 
there are limits to EU public health competences (for supportive action and coordination, for 
proposing legally binding measures to cross-border threats on health), the Union has a broad 
margin of discretion on public health matters.
The coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan had been widely televised, showing overstretched hospi-
tals and high fatality rates and the drastic measures taken by China (lockdown, cancellation of 
the New Year festivities), but was met with complacency in Europe. Initial scattered outbreaks 
in Europe were said to be controllable and did not spark preventive measures (e.g. control of 
all fl ights into Europe). The chief preoccupation was to avoid alarming the population rather 
than to control the spread by informing the public about the perils of not adopting social dis-
tancing behaviour. The performance of (much poorer) Asian and African countries, which did 
signifi cantly better in containing the pandemic, makes governance failures even more striking.
The European Commission attempted to coordinate member states’ responses, aiming to fi nd 
out about preparedness and promoting joint procurement of medical supplies and equipment. 
Yet, like member states, it did not grasp the scale of the challenge until Italy requested the ac-
tivation of the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism of European solidarity in disasters and not a 
single member state came forward (instead, prioritising protecting national stocks, as little or 
nothing had been done to produce or import protective equipment). That said, member states 
such as Greece that acted earlier than others upon witnessing Italy’s plight, fared better.
Having failed in terms of prevention, member states have since come to converge, in a non-
coordinated fashion, by adopting a variety of confi nement and containment strategies in an 
attempt to control exponentially rising infection numbers that risk outstripping healthcare 
capacities and reducing them to a level that would allow for following the World Health Or-
ganization’s guidance of testing, tracing and isolating. There are limits to what decentralised 
action can achieve against a virus that respects no borders. Any action at a local, regional or 
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national level, even if effective in terms of permitting a tailored approach to limiting contagion, 
is subject to spillovers. To prevent importing cases, member states cordoned off hotspots and 
discriminately closed internal Schengen borders. Countries can only open up if others have 
comparable performance and risk profi les.
The coronavirus crisis illustrated the fragility of European common goods like the single market 
and the Schengen agreement and even the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) if national 
measures are incompatible or insuffi ciently coordinated. Proposed temporary remedies are 
also problematic. For example, although ‘green corridors’ proposed by the European Commis-
sion have tried to safeguard the fl ow of vital goods (at the level of supply chains to limit the risk 
of disruptions), the free movement of people was suspended (with exceptions for some profes-
sions), which has high economic costs. Relaxing state aid rules in the crisis is not compatible 
with a level playing fi eld if countries with deeper pockets support and give an unfair advantage 
to their own fi rms (thereby eroding trust in the single market). Electronic contact tracing apps 
hinge on public acceptance, which requires trust in data protection rules and interoperability.
So what should the EU do? First, the EU should address the economic consequences of the 
current pandemic crisis through its eurozone framework to complete the economic side of 
the EMU and avoid negative spillovers to its monetary side. In fact, the immediate response 
to the economic impact of the crisis is largely being built on and developed within the govern-
ance structure of the eurozone through institutions put in place or envisaged at the time of the 
sovereign debt crisis: European Stability Mechanism, ECB measures, budgetary rules, the still 
incomplete banking union and the unemployment reinsurance scheme SURE. The proposed 
recovery fund is a tentative step in the right direction towards common bond issuance, which 
would also contribute to the EMU’s sustainability. The EU budget should not merely be en-
larged but should provide European public goods and objectives fi nanced by own resources.
Second, although it is a signifi cant governance challenge, the EU should defend its interests 
and its own project rather than wasting time with Brexit and aligning with one side of the inter-
nal debate in the UK. Remainers favoured a different, much-diluted Union, essentially a free 
trade zone with some cooperation in domains where the UK wants to pursue its own objectives 
at the global level (trade, defence, intelligence, etc.), making use of EU infrastructure, explicitly 
stated in the 2016 ‘new settlement for the UK within Europe’. Rather than insisting on self-harm-
ing extensions, the EU should make sure that the transition period ends by 31 December 2020 
and that any future agreement – should there be one – fully respects the integrity of its internal 
market, its common goods and European values. This is valid for all trade agreements.
Third, the crisis has shown that the EU has got its priorities – smart, social and sustainable de-
velopment – right. It brought home the importance of digital technologies and may prompt a 
general re-evaluation of the role of the state (welfare systems and regulation). In fact, the pan-
demic crisis is an acute crisis within a larger environment and climate crisis context. Health 
and the environment have public good characteristics, with potentially large longer-term dam-
age costs that tend not to be factored in. Moreover, the degradation of the environment, loss 
of biodiversity and practices like intensive and factory farming are linked to new diseases. 
In the novel pandemic, decision-makers adopted science-based policymaking to an extent 
that unfortunately has not happened in the climate crisis. The crisis context is the right time 
to correct market failures and promote the shift to sustainable production and consumption 
patterns for the benefi t of public health, the environment and sustainable development. The 
Green Deal already furnishes an adequate exit strategy. Calls for propping up unsustainable 
industries in the crisis should be resisted in order not to repeat the mistakes committed in the 
aftermath of the fi nancial and sovereign debt crises.
Note: The authors would like to pay tribute to Alberto Alesina whose work inspired so many 
of us in the fi eld of political economy.
